“No man’s life, liberty, or property is safe while the legislature is in session.” Mark Twain, 1866

You can say that again. The goal is to read and comment on the 35 (so far) pre-filed bills for Kentucky’s 2013 Legislative Session. I got the idea from Norm Davis at Take Back Kentucky.

I may have bitten off more than I can chew. It took all day to read this bill, pick it apart, then research the bits that warranted commenting.  I wonder if any of the legislating deciders spend even half that time researching before they vote? (Haha. At least I still have a sense of humor.)

While we ponder that bit of trivia, let’s get started with BR 17 sponsored by Representative Mike Harmon: An ACT relating to driving under the influence.

BR 17: Amends Old Law, Terribly Flawed

BR17 amends/changes existing law. There are two major flaws with this bill (the two major changes), plus a question:

1. First, it adds in civil forfeiture for DUI under certain conditions. STOP THAT!!! No more forfeiture of any personal property for any reason. Period. Civil forfeiture is theft by cop, policing for profit. The IJ has an excellent podcast on the topic and, in fact, is taking this travesty of justice to the U.S. Supreme Court.

2. Secondly, it doubles the “look-back” period so more Kentuckians, already beleaguered by a terrible economy, can be jailed after paying ever heftier fines to prop up the very court system that enslaves us. Plus, it makes work for all those tax consumers in Frankfort looking forward to pensions paid for by those of us who have none.

Let’s look on the bright side: maybe the additional paperwork will necessitate hiring more tax consumers for us to support. Government calls this “creating jobs.”

Sadly, these additions do nothing to address the problem of drunk driving. The intent seems to be more “protecting the public.” But it does not protect us. Is there any study that says harsher punishment makes people less likely to do the crime? NO. In fact, just the opposite. Search “do harsher penalties stop crime?” The evidence is overwhelming that it doesn’t.

Here’s what this bill accomplishes: it criminalizes, then punishes a larger swath of the citizenry. Mark Twain was so right.

DISCLAIMER: As hard as I am on this bill, I don’t think Representative Harmon is out to hurt anyone. I know him, he is a fair-minded person and I believe he believes this will help us more than hurt us. But that is not the case. NOTHING in this bill–in its entirety, not just these amendments–prevents drunk driving. It benefits only bigger government and furthers the police state, as I attempt to point out very specifically below.

3. What is good in this bill? Who does it protect? Who benefits? The red [#] indicates a footnote (18 in all) with my thoughts on the matter immediately following the section. Please share your thoughts in the comments — thank you!

Please look over BR17. If you agree that it is flawed, let Mike Harmon know it. Then copy your representative. Let’s kill this bill!

BR 17: AN ACT relating to driving under the influence.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:

Section 1. KRS 189A.010 is amended to read as follows:

(1) A person shall not operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle anywhere in this state:
(a) Having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 [1] or more as measured by a scientifically reliable test or tests of a sample of the person’s breath or blood taken within two (2) hours of cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle;

[1] The federal limit of .08 is NOT the result of actual stats on drunk driving accidents. First of all, the stats are padded: any accident involving a driver who had a drink in the previous 24 hours is deemed an alcohol-related accident, whether or not alcohol actually played a part in the accident.

The .08 limit is the result of MADD lobbying at the federal level which made federal highway money unavailable to states with a limit over .08. As usual, follow the money.

(b) While under the influence of alcohol;
(c) While under the influence of any other substance or combination of substances which impairs one’s driving ability; [Does this include coffee? Caffeine is a drug. Makes me a little jumpy sometimes…]
(d) While the presence of a controlled substance listed in subsection (12) of this section is detected in the blood, as measured by a scientifically reliable test, or tests, taken within two (2) hours of cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle;
(e) While under the combined influence of alcohol and any other substance which impairs one’s driving ability; or
(f) Having an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more as measured by a scientifically reliable test or tests of a sample of the person’s breath or blood taken within two (2) hours of cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle, if the person is under the age of twenty-one (21). [2]

[2] This allows the state to arrest people under 21. Great. Wait till you get to the penalties section (see [7] below). When did the government take over punishment of our minors? This is not only immoral, it is flat wrong. Kids do dumb things. As long as no one is hurt, give them to the parents for punishment. Minors are the property of the parents, not the state.

(2) With the exception of the results of the tests administered pursuant to KRS 189A.103(7), if the sample of the person’s blood or breath that is used to determine the alcohol concentration thereof was obtained more than two (2) hours after cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle, the results of the test or tests shall be inadmissible as evidence in a prosecution under subsection (1)(a) or (f) of this section. The results of the test or tests, however, may be admissible in a prosecution under subsection (1)(b) or (e) of this section.

(3) In any prosecution for a violation of subsection (1)(b) or (e) of this section in which the defendant is charged with having operated or been in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the alcohol concentration in the defendant’s blood as determined at the time of making analysis of his blood or breath shall give rise to the following presumptions:
(a) If there was an alcohol concentration of less than 0.05 based upon the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A.005, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol; and
(b) If there was an alcohol concentration of 0.05 or greater but less than 0.08 based upon the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A.005, that fact shall not constitute a presumption that the defendant either was or was not under the influence of alcohol, but that fact may be considered, together with other competent evidence, in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. [3] The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the questions of whether the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or other substances, in any prosecution for a violation of subsection (1)(b) or (e) of this section.

[3] Slipping in a little provision to take the limit down to .05. This is not to protect anyone (because study after study proves it doesn’t). This simply widens the net to make more people criminals to collect more fines, to keep the courts and the prisons and the huge bureaucracy churning out paperwork, taking home fat government paychecks, working towards those pensions you and I pay for.

Make no mistake: pretty soon the legal standard for everyone will be .05. It’s been done in other states.

Here’s the irony: this lowering of the standard is not a consequence of bad behavior. It’s not a consequence of an increase in drunk driving. It’s not an effort to make the streets safer, although that will be the argument.

What it does is make it possible for more people to break a law and wind up in the court system. It makes currently legal behavior (driving with .05 alcohol) illegal for no apparent reason — then institutes a consequence that results in a bigger, more powerful government.

This is not good leadership. This is stealing from and enslaving a citizenry using its own money.

(4) (a)  Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the fact that any person charged with violation of subsection (1) of this section is legally entitled to use any substance, including alcohol, shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violation of subsection (1) of this section.
(b) A laboratory test or tests for a controlled substance shall be inadmissible as evidence in a prosecution under subsection (1)(d) of this section upon a finding by the court that the defendant consumed the substance under a valid prescription from a practitioner, as defined in KRS 218A.010, acting in the course of his or her professional practice. [4]

[4] This makes no sense. You can legally drink alcohol which might cause you to drive recklessly. The fact that you legally consumed a legal substance is no defense. Ok, I get that.

However, if you legally consume a drug that causes you to drive recklessly, that drug test is inadmissable and you are free to go.

So: you are allowed to drive recklessly if you are using prescription drugs, but not if you are using alcohol. Who thought this up? Big pharma?

Legal prescription drugs, by the way, kill far more people when used as prescribed than alcohol and illegal drugs combined.

(5) Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall:
(a) For the first offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period [5], be fined not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than forty-eight (48) hours nor more than thirty (30) days, or both. Following sentencing, the defendant may apply to the judge for permission to enter a community labor program for not less than forty-eight (48) hours nor more than thirty (30) days in lieu of fine or imprisonment, or both. If any of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (11) of this section are present while the person was operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be four (4) days, which term shall not be suspended, probated, conditionally discharged, or subject to any other form of early release;

[5] Here’s where we double the “look back” period from 5 years to 10. Why? What could this possibly do to prevent drunk driving? (Nothing.) The only thing it accomplishes is to allow more of us to be punished for longer.

Apparently, we aren’t making enough money in fines and don’t have enough inmate-cabinetmakers to keep the prison furniture store stocked full of stuff to sell… so the government’s solution is to widen the net to keep those prisons full and our prisoner-powered industries rolling along (see [13] below).

(b) For the second offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period,[ be fined not less than three hundred fifty dollars ($350) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than seven (7) days nor more than six (6) months and, in addition to fine and imprisonment, may be sentenced to community labor for not less than ten (10) days nor more than six (6) months. If any of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (11) of this section are present, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be fourteen (14) days, which term shall not be suspended, probated, conditionally discharged, or subject to any other form of early release;
(c) For a third offense within a five (5) year period,] be fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than twelve (12) months and may, in addition to fine and imprisonment, be sentenced to community labor for not less than ten (10) days nor more than twelve (12) months. If any of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (11) of this section are present, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be sixty (60) days, which term shall not be suspended, probated, conditionally discharged, or subject to any other form of early release;
(c)[(d)] For a third[fourth] or subsequent offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period, be guilty of a Class D felony. If any of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (11) of this section are present, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be two hundred forty (240) days, which term shall not be suspended, probated, conditionally discharged, or subject to any other form of release; and [6]

[6] Get a grip, Frankfort. At this rate, everything will be a felony and no one will be able to own a gun or vote when they get out of prison. Stop this: no more pre-crime, pre-harm felonies without a victim. The fact is that, today, far more of us are harmed by punishment than by crime:

(CNN) reports: “The United States leads the world in the rate of incarcerating its own citizens. We imprison more of our own people than any other country on earth, including China which has four times our population, or in human history. And now, a new Pew report announces that we are keeping even nonviolent inmates behind bars for increasingly longer terms.” Who benefits? (See [13] below.)

(d)[(e)] For purposes of this subsection, prior offenses shall include all convictions in this state, and any other state or jurisdiction, for operating or being in control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or other substances that impair one’s driving ability, or any combination of alcohol and such substances, or while having an unlawful alcohol concentration, or driving while intoxicated, but shall not include convictions for violating subsection (1)(f) of this section. A court shall receive as proof of a prior conviction a copy of that conviction, certified by the court ordering the conviction.

(6) Any person who violates the provisions of subsection (1)(f) of this section shall have his driving privilege or operator’s license suspended by the court for a period of no less than thirty (30) days but no longer than six (6) months, and the person shall be fined no less than one hundred dollars ($100) and no more than five hundred dollars ($500), or sentenced to twenty (20) hours of community service in lieu of a fine. A person subject to the penalties of this subsection shall not be subject to the penalties established in subsection (5) of this section or any other penalty established pursuant to KRS Chapter 189A, except those established in KRS 189A.040(1).

(7) If the person is under the age of twenty-one (21) and there was an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater based on the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A.005, the person shall be subject to the penalties established pursuant to subsection (5) of this section. [7]

[7] Jail time for minors? FELONIES for minors? We have lost our minds.

What happened to parenting? When did the government take over punishment of our minors? This is not only immoral, it is flat wrong. Kids do dumb things. As long as no one is hurt, give them to the parents for punishment. Minors are the property of the parents, not the state.

(Yes, that is a repeat of [3] above. It’s so important, I’d like to find a place to say it again.)

(8) For a second [or third] offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period, the minimum sentence of imprisonment or community labor shall not be suspended, probated, or subject to conditional discharge or other form of early release. For a third[fourth] or subsequent offense under this section, the minimum term of imprisonment shall be 120 days, and this term shall not be suspended, probated, or subject to conditional discharge or other form of early release. For a second or subsequent offense, at least forty-eight (48) hours of the mandatory sentence shall be served consecutively. [8]

(9) When sentencing persons under subsection (5)(a) of this section, at least one (1) of the penalties shall be assessed and that penalty shall not be suspended, probated, or subject to conditional discharge or other form of early release. [9]

[8 and 9] If prison time does not abate drunk driving and only adds to the productive economy’s tax burden, why force people into prison? Do the overlords own stock in prison corporations (CAA and GEO)?

And shouldn’t we leave sentencing discretion up to judges? Otherwise, why are we paying judges? If there’s no judicial consideration going on, why can’t the clerk just read the punishment from the law in court? Seriously, if we are going to make laws like this, why have a judge?

(10) In determining the ten (10)[five (5)] year period under this section, the period shall be measured from the dates on which the offenses occurred for which the judgments of conviction were entered.

(11) For purposes of this section, aggravating circumstances are any one (1) or more of the following:
(a) Operating a motor vehicle in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour above the speed limit;
(b) Operating a motor vehicle in the wrong direction on a limited access highway;
(c) Operating a motor vehicle that causes an accident resulting in death or serious physical injury as defined in KRS 500.080;
(d) Operating a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in the operator’s blood or breath is 0.15 or more as measured by a test or tests of a sample of the operator’s blood or breath taken within two (2) hours of cessation of operation of the motor vehicle;
(e) Refusing to submit to any test or tests of one’s blood, breath, or urine requested by an officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of subsection (1) of this section; and [10]

[10] A Kentuckian can be punished for refusing a search without a warrant? Is that even legal? (No.)

(f)  Operating a motor vehicle that is transporting a passenger under the age of twelve (12) years old. [11]

[11] Ah, of course. It’s the “WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN???” clause. Any abrogation of rights is permissible as long as you claim it’s for the safety of the children.

So, of course, you’ll find this clause in more and more legislation. Up to now, it’s been an unassailable position. Up to now. Brace yourself, Frankfort. We are done giving up our property and liberties. We intend to not only take them back, but to keep them, perhaps even strengthen them. For the children.

(12) The substances applicable to a prosecution under subsection (1)(d) of this section are:
(a) Any Schedule I controlled substance except marijuana; [CURIOUS.]
(b) Alprazolam;
(c) Amphetamine;
(d) Buprenorphine;
(e) Butalbital;
(f) Carisoprodol;
(g) Cocaine;
(h) Diazepam;
(i) Hydrocodone;
(j) Meprobamate;
(k) Methadone;
(l) Methamphetamine;
(m) Oxycodone;
(n) Promethazine;
(o) Propoxyphene; and
(p) Zolpidem.

Section 2. KRS 189A.030 is amended to read as follows:

(1) (a) Terms of imprisonment for first[ and second] offenders under KRS 189A.010 shall, at the order of the court, be served on weekends or such other times as may preserve the employment or education of the offender, provided that no individual period of incarceration shall be less than twenty-four (24) hours.
(b) Terms of imprisonment for second offenders under KRS 189A.010 may, at the order of the court, be served on weekends or such other times as may preserve the employment or education of the offender, provided that no individual period of incarceration shall be less than twenty-four (24) hours.

(2) Children shall be detained pursuant to the applicable provisions of KRS Chapters 600 to 645. [12]

[12] I’m afraid to even read KRS Chapters 600 to 645…

Section 3.   KRS 189A.040 is amended to read as follows:

(1) In addition to any other penalty prescribed by KRS 189A.010(5)(a) or (6), the court shall sentence the person to attend an alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program subject to the following terms and conditions for a first offender or a person convicted under KRS 189A.010(1)(f):
(a) The treatment or education shall be for a period of ninety (90) days and the program shall provide an assessment of the defendant’s alcohol or other substance abuse problems, which shall be performed at the start of the program;
(b) Each defendant shall pay the cost of the education or treatment program up to his ability to pay but no more than the actual cost of the treatment; [13]

[13] We are sentencing people who drove drunk to drug and alcohol treatment? Is everyone who drives drunk in need of treatment? Of course not. Besides, statistically speaking, treatment centers don’t work. (I happen to already be an expert on this topic.)

There is a free program that, statistically, does work. And it’s FREE. Maybe you’ve heard of it: Alcoholics Anonymous?

Here’s why AA is ignored: there’s no money to be made, no favors to be traded. There are legislators, law enforcement, judges, prosecutors and prison guards who hold stock in the prison industry (CAA and GEO). Treatment centers are part of the prison system. The “humane” part, lol. When prisons and treatment centers are full, this makes money for stock holders and ensures campaign contributions from CEOs.

In fact, CAA, with whom Kentucky has contracted to run some of its prisons, has a clause in its contract requiring that Kentucky keep its prisons full. Otherwise, CAA can’t make a profit.

Yeah, sickening. The prison system is not about protecting the public. It’s about profits. Follow the money.

(c) Upon written report to the court by the administrator of the program that the defendant has completed the program recommended by the administrator based upon the assessment of the defendant, the defendant shall be released prior to the expiration of the ninety (90) day period; and
(d) Failure to complete the education or treatment program or to pay the amount specified by the court for education or treatment shall constitute contempt, and the court shall, in addition to any other remedy for contempt, reinstitute all penalties which were previously imposed but suspended or delayed pending completion of the education or treatment program.

(2)[ In addition to any other penalty prescribed by KRS 189A.010(5)(b), the court shall sentence the person to an alcohol or substance abuse treatment program subject to the following terms and conditions for a second offender:
(a) The sentence shall be for a period of one (1) year and the program shall provide an assessment of the defendant’s alcohol or other substance abuse problems, which shall be performed at the start of the program;
(b) Each defendant shall pay the cost of the treatment program up to his ability to pay but no more than the actual cost of the treatment;
(c) Upon written report to the court by the administrator of the program that the defendant has completed the program recommended by the administrator based upon the assessment of the defendant, the defendant may be released prior to the expiration of the one (1) year period; and
(d) Failure to complete the treatment program or to pay the amount specified by the court for treatment shall constitute contempt of court and the court shall, in addition to any other remedy for contempt, reinstitute all penalties which were previously imposed but suspended or delayed pending the completion of the treatment program.

(3)] In addition to any other penalty prescribed by KRS 189A.010(5)(b) or (c)[ or (d)], the court shall sentence the person to an alcohol or substance abuse treatment program subject to the following terms and conditions for a third or subsequent offender:
(a) The sentence shall be for a period of one (1) year and the program shall provide an assessment of the defendant’s alcohol or other substance abuse problems, which shall be performed at the start of the program. The program may be an inpatient or residential-type program;
(b) Each defendant shall pay the cost of the treatment program up to his ability to pay but no more than the actual cost of the program;
(c) A defendant, upon written recommendation to the court by the administrator of the program, may be released from the inpatient or residential program prior to the expiration of one (1) year but shall be retained in the program on an outpatient basis for the remainder of the year period; and
(d) Failure to complete the treatment program or to pay the amount specified by the court for treatment shall constitute contempt of court, and the court shall, in addition to any other remedy for contempt, reinstitute all penalties which were previously imposed but suspended or delayed pending completion of the treatment program.

(3)[(4)] Costs of treatment or education programs which are paid from the service fee established by KRS 189A.050, or from state or federal funds, or any combination thereof, shall be deducted from the amount which the defendant must pay.

(4)[(5)] For the purposes of this section, “treatment” means service in an alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program or facility licensed, regulated, and monitored by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services for services as required under this section.

(5)[(6)] The Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall promulgate administrative regulations for the licensure of education and treatment facilities and programs for offenders receiving education or treatment under this section. The criteria developed by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall include:
(a) Manner of assessment;
(b) Appropriate education and treatment plans; and
(c) Referrals to other treatment providers.

(6)[(7)] The participating facilities and programs shall be required to abide by these standards and shall report completion to the Transportation Cabinet. Upon request, the facility or program shall report to the courts regarding the progress of offenders being treated pursuant to this section.

(7)[(8)] Administrative decisions regarding the licensure of education and treatment facilities and programs may be appealed, and upon appeal an administrative hearing shall be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.

Section 4. KRS 189A.070 is amended to read as follows:

(1) Unless the person is under eighteen (18) years of age, in addition to the penalties specified in KRS 189A.010, a person convicted of violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle revoked by the court as follows:
(a) For the first offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period, for a period of not less than thirty (30) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days;
(b) For the second offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period,[ for a period of not less than twelve (12) months nor more than eighteen (18) months;
(c) For a third offense within a five (5) year period,] for a period of not less than twenty-four (24) months nor more than thirty-six (36) months; and
(c)[(d)] For a third[fourth] or subsequent offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period, sixty (60) months.
(d)[(e) For purposes of this section, “offense” shall have the same meaning as described in KRS 189A.010(5)(d)[(e)].

(2) In determining the ten (10)[five (5)] year period under this section, the period shall be measured from the dates on which the offenses occurred for which the judgments of conviction were entered.

(3) In addition to the period of license revocation set forth in subsection (1) or (7) of this section, no person shall be eligible for reinstatement of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle until he has completed the alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program ordered pursuant to KRS 189A.040.

(4) A person under the age of eighteen (18) who is convicted of violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) shall have his license revoked by the court until he reaches the age of eighteen (18) or shall have his license revoked as provided in subsection (1) or (7) of this section, whichever penalty will result in the longer period of revocation or court-ordered driving conditions.

(5) Licenses revoked pursuant to this chapter shall forthwith be surrendered to the court upon conviction. The court shall transmit the conviction records, and other appropriate information to the Transportation Cabinet. A court shall not waive or stay this procedure.

(6) Should a person convicted under this chapter whose license is revoked fail to surrender it to the court upon conviction, the court shall issue an order directing the sheriff or any other peace officer to seize the license forthwith and deliver it to the court.

(7) A person whose license has been revoked pursuant to subsection (1)(b) or (c)[, (c), or (d)] of this section may move the court to reduce the applicable minimum period of revocation by one-half (1/2), but in no case less than twelve (12) months. The court may, upon a written finding in the record for good cause shown, order such a period to be reduced by one-half (1/2), but in no case less than twelve (12) months, if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) The person shall not operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle without an ignition interlock device as provided for in KRS 189A.340(2);
(b) The person shall not operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle at any other time and for any other purposes than those specified by the court; and
(c) The ignition interlock device shall be installed on the motor vehicle or motorcycle for a period of time not less than the applicable minimum period of revocation provided for under subsection (1)(b) or (c)[, (c), or (d)] of this section nor for more than the respective maximum period of revocation provided for under subsection (1)(b) or (c)[, (c), or (d)] of this section.

(8) Upon a finding of a violation of any of the conditions specified in subsection (7) of this section or of the order permitting any reduction in a minimum period of revocation that is issued pursuant thereto, the court shall dissolve such an order and the person shall receive no credit toward the minimum period of revocation required under subsection (1)(b) or (c)[, (c), or (d)] of this section.

Section 5. KRS 189A.090 is amended to read as follows:

(1) No person shall operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle while his license is revoked or suspended under KRS 189A.010(6), 189A.070, 189A.107, 189A.200, or 189A.220, or operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle without a functioning ignition interlock device in violation of KRS 189A.345(1).

(2) In addition to any other penalty imposed by the court, any person who violates subsection (1) of this section shall:
(a) For a first offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period, be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor and have his license revoked by the court for six (6) months, unless at the time of the offense the person was also operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), in which event he shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and have his license revoked by the court for a period of one (1) year;
(b) For a second offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period, be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and have his license revoked by the court for one (1) year, unless at the time of the offense the person was also operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), in which event he shall be guilty of a Class D felony and have his license revoked by the court for a period of two (2) years;
(c) For a third or subsequent offense within a ten (10)[five (5)] year period, be guilty of a Class D felony and have his license revoked by the court for two (2) years, unless at the time of the offense the person was also operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), in which event he shall be guilty of a Class D felony and have his license revoked by the court for a period of five (5) years.

(3) The ten (10)[five (5)] year period under this section shall be measured in the same manner as in KRS 189A.070.

(4) After one (1) year of the period of revocation provided for in subsection (2)(b) or (c) of this section has elapsed, a person whose license has been revoked pursuant to either of those paragraphs[subsections] may move the court to have an ignition interlock device installed for the remaining portion of the period of revocation. The court may, upon a written finding in the record for good cause shown, order an ignition interlock device installed if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) The person shall not operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle without an ignition interlock device as provided for in KRS 189A.340(2);
(b) The person shall not operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle at any other time and for any other purposes than those specified by the court; and
(c) The ignition interlock device shall be installed on the motor vehicle or motorcycle for a period of time not less than the period of revocation required for the person under subsection (2)(b) or (c) of this section.

(5) Upon a finding of a violation of any of the conditions specified in subsection (4) of this section or of the order permitting the installation of an ignition interlock device in lieu of the remaining period of revocation that is issued pursuant thereto, the court shall dissolve such an order and the person shall receive no credit toward the remaining period of revocation required under subsection (2)(b) or (c) of this section.

(6) (a) In addition to the penalties specified in this section, any motor vehicle owned by the violator and used in the commission of an offense under this section shall be subject to forfeiture under the same terms, conditions, and defenses and using the same process as set out in KRS 218A.405 to 218A.460 for property subject to forfeiture under that chapter.
(b) Administrative regulations promulgated under KRS 218A.420 shall govern expenditures derived from forfeitures under this section to the same extent that they govern expenditures from forfeitures under KRS 218A.405 to 218A.460.
(c) Upon the request of a co-owner of a motor vehicle subject to forfeiture under this section, the court shall allow the motor vehicle to be transferred to the co-owner in lieu of forfeiture if the court finds that the co-ownership existed at the time of the commission of the offense. When the court allows a transfer under this paragraph, it shall enter an order subjecting the violator to contempt if the violator subsequently operates or re-acquires an ownership interest in the vehicle.
(d) A motor vehicle owned by a subsequent bona fide purchaser or transferee who was not a co-owner of the vehicle shall not be subject to forfeiture under this subsection. [14]

[14] Here we are, the golden goose of law enforcement: civil forfeiture. Lose your $25,000 F150 for an offense carrying a $100 fine.

Number 6 simply promotes more theft by cop, the incentive that drives what the Institute for Justice calls “policing for profit.” Who benefits? Uh, cops. Not us. Stealing a person’s car doesn’t prevent them from driving, just makes them far poorer. A drunk driver can’t get hold of another car to drive? Please.

The way this works is, if you get stopped by a cop under suspicion of drunk driving, he can steal your car. You are guilty until proven innocent just on the cop’s say so. (Keep reading, the “say so” thing is covered at [14].) They might call it “impounding” but, when civil forfeiture is in place, you have to sue to get your car back, even if you are found not guilty.

While you ponder that injustice, ask yourself how you will get the kids to school and yourself to work until you get your truck back, if you ever do? How will you make the F150 payments (because you will still be on the hook for those) and get a replacement car?

Other state governments have passed these laws. Now, because of rampant abuse by law enforcement, those citizens are fighting to have these bad laws overturned. Let’s just not even go there.

Section 6. KRS 189A.200 is amended to read as follows:

(1) The court shall at the arraignment or as soon as such relevant information becomes available suspend the motor vehicle operator’s license and motorcycle operator’s license and driving privileges of any person charged with a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) who:
(a) Has refused to take an alcohol concentration or substance test as reflected on the uniform citation form; [15]

[15] What about the 4th Amendment? You know, the whole “No search without a warrant” thing? This clause is an affront to Kentuckians and all U.S. citizens.

In fact, this bill and others like it (think Snot Tax and Fake Pot) are doing irreparable harm with its punishments, fines, drug testing of grandmas and infringement of our natural rights.

(b) Has been convicted of one (1) or more prior offenses as described in KRS 189A.010(5)(d)[(e)] or has had his operator’s license revoked or suspended on one (1) or more occasions for refusing to take an alcohol concentration or substance test, in the ten (10)[five (5)] year period immediately preceding his arrest; or
(c) Was involved in an accident that resulted in death or serious physical injury as defined in KRS 500.080 to a person other than the defendant.

(2) Persons whose licenses have been suspended pursuant to this section may file a motion for judicial review of the suspension, and the court shall conduct the review in accordance with this chapter within thirty (30) days after the filing of the motion. The court shall, at the time of the suspension, advise the defendant of his rights to the review.

(3) When the court orders the suspension of a license pursuant to this section, the defendant shall immediately surrender the license to the Circuit Court clerk, and the court shall retain the defendant in court or remand him into the custody of the sheriff until the license is produced and surrendered. If the defendant has lost his operator’s license, other than due to a previous suspension or revocation, which is still in effect, the sheriff shall take him to the office of the circuit clerk so that a new license can be issued. If the license is currently under suspension or revocation, the provisions of this subsection shall not apply.

(4) The Circuit Court Clerk shall forthwith transmit to the Transportation Cabinet any license surrendered to him pursuant to this section.

(5) Licenses suspended under this section shall remain suspended until a judgment of conviction or acquittal is entered in the case or until the court enters an order terminating the suspension, but in no event for a period longer than the maximum license suspension period applicable to the person under KRS 189A.070 and 189A.107.

(6) Any person whose operator’s license has been suspended pursuant to this section shall be given credit for all pretrial suspension time against the period of revocation imposed. Licenses suspended under this section shall remain suspended until a judgment of conviction or acquittal is entered in the case or until the court enters an order terminating the suspension, but in no event for a period longer than the maximum license suspension period applicable to the person under KRS 189A.070 and 189A.107.

Section 7.   KRS 189A.240 is amended to read as follows:

In any judicial review of a pretrial suspension imposed under KRS 189A.200(1)(b), if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) The person was charged and arrested by a peace officer with a violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e); [16]

(2) The peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e);

(3) There is probable cause to believe that the person committed the violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) as charged; and

(4) The person has been convicted of one (1) or more prior offenses as described in KRS 189A.010(5)(d)[(e)] or has had his motor vehicle operator’s license suspended or revoked on one (1) or more occasions for refusing to take an alcohol concentration or substance test, in the ten (10)[five (5)] year period immediately preceding his arrest, then the court shall continue to suspend the person’s operator’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. The provisions of this section shall not be construed as limiting the person’s ability to challenge any prior convictions or license suspensions or refusals.

[16] Numbers 1-4 here open the door wide to vindictive enforcement by officers, something I have seen first-hand. Basically, if the officer “says so,” you have no rights. Huh? Who came up with this? A cop?

Plus, if this bill passes, the officer “says so” and he gets to keep your car. Because everything gained in forfeiture goes to the cops. Off the record and off the budget. Sweet.

Not innocent, you say? Prove it. YOU have to prove a negative. Good luck with that. Donate your money to the Institute for Justice (who only sues governments for free) and pray they win in front of the SCOTUS.

Section 8.   KRS 189A.340 is amended to read as follows:

(1) In lieu of ordering license plate impoundment under KRS 189A.085 of a person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of KRS 189A.010, the court may order installation of an ignition interlock device as provided in this section as follows:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this subsection, at the time that the court revokes a person’s license under any provision of KRS 189A.070 other than KRS 189A.070(1)(a), the court shall also order that, at the conclusion of the license revocation, the person shall be prohibited from operating any motor vehicle or motorcycle without a functioning ignition interlock device.
(b) 1. The first time in a ten (10)[five (5)] year period that a person is penalized under this section, a functioning ignition interlock device shall be installed for a period of six (6) months.
2. The second time in a ten (10)[five (5)] year period that a person is penalized under this section, a functioning ignition interlock device shall be installed for a period of twelve (12) months.
3. The third or subsequent time in a ten (10)[five (5)] year period that a person is penalized under this section, a functioning ignition interlock device shall be installed for a period of thirty (30) months.
4. The person whose license has been suspended for a second or subsequent violation of KRS 189A.010 shall not be able to apply to the court for permission to install an ignition interlock device until the person has completed one (1) year of license suspension without any subsequent conviction for a violation of KRS 189A.010 or 189A.090. If the court grants permission to install an ignition interlock device, an ignition interlock device shall be installed on all vehicles owned or leased by the person whose license has been suspended.
(c) In determining the ten (10)[five (5)] year period under paragraph (b) of this subsection, the period shall be measured from the dates on which the offenses occurred for which the judgments of conviction were entered, resulting in the license revocations described in KRS 189A.070.
(d) If the court finds that a person is required to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle in the course and scope of the person’s employment and the motor vehicle or motorcycle is owned by the employer, then the court shall order that the person may operate that motor vehicle or motorcycle during regular working hours for the purposes of his or her employment without installation of a functioning ignition interlock device on that motor vehicle or motorcycle if the employer has been notified of the prohibition established under paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this subsection.

(2) Upon ordering the installation of a functioning ignition interlock device, the court, without a waiver or a stay of the following procedure, shall:
(a) Transmit its order and other appropriate information to the Transportation Cabinet;
(b) Direct that the Transportation Cabinet records reflect:
1. That the person shall not operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle without a functioning ignition interlock device, except as provided in paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of this section; and
2. Whether the court has expressly permitted the person to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle without a functioning ignition interlock device, as provided in paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of this section;
(c) Direct the Transportation Cabinet to attach or imprint a notation on the driver’s license of any person restricted under this section stating that the person shall operate only a motor vehicle or motorcycle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device. However, if the exception provided for in paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of this section applies, the notation shall indicate the exception;
(d) Require proof of the installation of the functioning ignition interlock device and periodic reporting by the person for the verification of the proper functioning of the device;
(e) Require the person to have the device serviced and monitored at least every thirty (30) days for proper functioning by an entity approved by the Transportation Cabinet; and
(f)  Require the person to pay the reasonable cost of leasing or buying, installing, servicing, and monitoring the device. The court may establish a payment schedule for the person to follow in paying the cost.

(3) The Transportation Cabinet shall:
(a) Certify ignition interlock devices for use in this Commonwealth; [17]

(b) Approve ignition interlock device installers who install functioning ignition interlock devices under the requirements of this section;

(c) Approve servicing and monitoring entities identified in paragraph (e) of subsection (2) of this section and require those entities to report on driving activity within seven (7) days of servicing and monitoring each ignition interlock device to the respective court, prosecuting attorney, and defendant;
(d) Publish and periodically update on the Transportation Cabinet web site a list of the certified ignition interlock devices, the approved ignition interlock installers, and the approved servicing and monitoring entities;
(e) Develop a warning label that an ignition interlock device installer shall place on a functioning ignition interlock device before installing that device. The warning label shall warn of the penalties established in KRS 189A.345; and
(f)  Promulgate administrative regulations to carry out the provisions of this subsection.

[17] Section 8(3)(a-e) is all about friends in the business: some politician’s BIL imports these from China. Or installs them. Or monitors them.

(f) is all about making work for the tax consumers (we support) who will promulgate the regulations that will further enslave us at our expense.

Who benefits from any of these hoops? Still nothing here to prevent drunk driving. Because the world is full of loopholes and drunks are creative. (My area of expertise.)

Section 9. KRS 281A.2102 is amended to read as follows:

In addition to the penalties established by this chapter for driving a commercial motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol:
(1) Any person convicted of driving a commercial motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration of the person’s blood or breath is four hundredths (0.04) to eight hundredths (0.08) shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) and not more than fifty dollars ($50).

(2) Any person convicted of driving a commercial motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration of the person’s blood or breath is greater than eight hundredths (0.08) shall be fined under the provisions of KRS 189A.010(5)(a) to (c)[(d)]. [18]

[18] I must be reading this wrong. It seems to give DUIs in commercial vehicles a pass? Huh? This would be funny except the rest of the bill is so warped, it fits right in! There’s got to be more to this…

BR17? The Whole Thing Should be Scrapped.

I realize too late that I should never read bills. It’s infuriating to see just exactly how the enslavement works. I need a drink.

P.S. Interesting website that makes a LOT of sense: Drive-Safely.net: Abolish Drunk Driving Laws.

P.S.S. I need help tackling the other pre-filed bills, liberty warriors. Please? We have to know what our overlords have in store for us. Otherwise, we’re going to remain on this carousel, this crazy carousel…